Multi-centred governance and circuits of power in liberal modes of security by Edwards, Adam
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fglc20
Download by: [Cardiff University Libraries] Date: 26 September 2016, At: 07:57
Global Crime
ISSN: 1744-0572 (Print) 1744-0580 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fglc20
Multi-centred governance and circuits of power in
liberal modes of security
Adam Edwards
To cite this article: Adam Edwards (2016) Multi-centred governance and circuits of power in
liberal modes of security, Global Crime, 17:3-4, 240-263, DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2016.1179629
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2016.1179629
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 02 May 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 291
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Multi-centred governance and circuits of power in liberal modes of
security
Adam Edwards*
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
Multi-centred governance is epitomised in current struggles to better ‘secure’ liberal
democracies as nation state actors are obliged to act ‘in partnership’ with corporate and
non-governmental organisations whilst confronting illicit actors with enhanced digital
capacities to circumvent and organisationally outflank both state and corporate powers.
Examples of such social technologies, particularly Disruptive Digital Technologies
(DDTs), include the use of social media communications for challenging elite con-
structions of social problems, networked distributed manufacturing technologies for
the ‘weaponisation’ of civil society and the use of unmanned airborne vehicles
(UAV’s) or ‘drones’ for surveillance and counter-surveillance. The paper draws upon
research into transnational organised crime and urban security in Europe to illustrate
the circuits of power that constitute liberal modes of security through causal relations
of power-dependence, dispositions that fix or re-fix the meaning and membership
categories of security and technologies of production and discipline that can facilitate
the disruption or reproduction of these causes and dispositions.
Keywords: governance; security; circuits of power; disruptive digital technologies;
urban security; organised crime
1. Introduction
Contemporary argument about the role of the state in the governance of liberal democ-
racies entails a dispute over trends toward the decentring of power away from the nation
state and its diffusion downwards to local and regional authorities, upwards to supra-
national authorities and outwards to commercial enterprises.1 Such trends are of obvious
concern to the study of security and the capacity of nation states to deliver on their most
basic, constitutive, obligation to guarantee universal public safety within their territorial
jurisdictions2 and in conditions of the alleged ‘globalisation’ of crime and other security
threats that are believed to subvert this sovereignty.3
Here, these arguments are considered in relation to critics of governance theories who
have reasserted the significance of sovereign nation-state power and, therefore, a need to re-
centre the study of the state in the analysis of governmental power.4 In turn, it is argued that
tendencies to de-centre or re-centre the analysis of political power in liberal modes of
governing arise out of a preoccupation with a sovereign concept of power as a property that
emanates from, or is constituted against, the core executive. This preoccupation is signalled
in the architectural language of ‘tiers’ and ‘levels’ of governing above, at or beneath the
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nation state. If, however, a more strategic concept of power is adopted, the core executive
appears as but one centre or ‘obligatory passage point’ in a complex circuitry of relations of
power and resistance that produces multiple-centres of governance or passage points
through which aspirant governors must pass in order to realise their policy goals.5 An
appreciation of the multiple passage points entails an understanding of the relations of
power-dependence6 that structure and differentiate liberal modes of governance. These
relations are characterised by asymmetries, for example between the constitutional-legal
powers of nation states, which corporate powers have to negotiate, and the financial powers
of corporations on which states depend to deliver on their electoral mandates.7 There are,
however, other breaks in the circuitry of liberal governance including actors within civil
society that are capable of disrupting state and corporate power, particularly given the rise of
various digital technologies for social media communication, networked distributed manu-
facture and the enhanced surveillance of populations.8
This paper advances the novel concept of ‘multi-centred governance’ as an emergent
condition of these circuits of power and resistance. An implication of this for the study of
security9 is that analysis needs to progress beyond accounts of the limits to sovereign state
power to explanations of the strategic ‘power to’ secure in conditions of asymmetrical
power-dependence.10 A corollary of the focus on power-dependence is a concern with the
integral relationship between state power and civil society and the proposition that devel-
opments in one of these fields, such as the proliferation of serious crime networks, cannot be
divorced from developments in the other, such as the degradation of state powers through
austerity programmes. How this integral, necessary, relationship is contingently worked out
in specific social contexts is a matter for concrete empirical case studies11 underpinned by
the framework for conceptualising governance and security advanced here.
To justify the concept of multi-centred governance (MCG), the article draws upon
Clegg’s12 ‘circuits of power framework’ to distinguish this concept both from other
theories of governance and from their critics involved in current debates about security
in advanced liberal democracies. This is primarily an exercise in conceptual and metho-
dological analysis, not an empirical case study, in which the concept of MCG is distin-
guished in terms of its commitment to a realist aetiology of political power beyond the
state. However the contribution of this concept is illustrated throughout through reference
to the author’s own empirical work on urban security, transnational organised crime and
disruptive digital technologies. To this end the case for a theory of multi-centred govern-
ance is made through reference to the analytical shift in debates over liberal modes of
security from a preoccupation with sovereignty to a greater interest in strategic concepts
of power. Having made this case, section three illustrates the three circuits of causal,
dispositional and facilitative power that constitute multiple centres of power. The argu-
ment then concludes with some conjectures about prospects for the exercise of power and
resistance in liberal modes of security and the further research agenda implied by the
acknowledgement of multiple-centres of power.
2. Conceptualising governance and security: from sovereignty to strategy
Governance has been located in studies of policing and security in terms of its ‘other’, the
government of ‘sovereign powers’ and, especially, their failures and limitations. In
Anglophone criminology, for example, one of the most cited papers on contemporary
strategies of crime control concentrates on the ‘Limits to the Sovereign State’.13 David
Garland’s essay crystallises concerns about the need to adapt to the normality of crime and
the incapacity of states to deliver on their self-legitimating ‘punitive display’ through
Global Crime 241
various narratives of warfare on crime, drugs and terror etc. There is an affinity with
broader work on the limits to hierarchical rule noting the failure of administrations to
appreciate the constitution of polities differentiated through related but discrete policy
networks.14 In relation to security, limitations have been identified in evaluations of policy
responses to mundane problems of crime and punishment, the idea that ‘nothing works’
given the high recidivism rate of those offenders successfully prosecuted and imprisoned,
placed on probation or fined. Critics of state power in the UK, for example, note the huge
attrition rate in which such prosecutions only apply to those responsible for less than 5 per
cent of estimated notifiable offences.15 Limits to sovereign power are also registered in
policy discourse about the growing importance of transnational threats to national security
such as ‘organised crime’, mass migration and terrorism often glossed in terms of
‘globalization and crime’.16
2.1. Sovereign power and security: reconstructing leviathan?
More recently, however, a counter-narrative has emerged that criticises the concept of
governance for underestimating the resilience and continued centrality of sovereign nation
states to the exercise of governmental power. Most notably, in the latest instalment of his
analytical history of social power, the political sociologist Michael Mann argues that:
The belief that globalization is undermining the nation-state is very widespread . . . All this is
greatly exaggerated . . . It is a very Western-centric view, tending to see market capitalism as
universal. Yet . . . much of the world lives under politicized versions of capitalism in which
one acquires access to economic resources through connections to the state. Moreover, even
in the West the state is not so much declining as changing. The global economy still needs
regulation by states, and nation-states have acquired a whole range of new functions, from
providing welfare to interfering in family and sexual life.17
Within studies of security this argument finds its counterpart in the work of those seeking
to re-emphasise the centrality of the national ‘security state’.18 In their recent account of
the shift from welfare state to security state formations, Hallsworth and Lea signal their
connection with the Hobbesian tradition of thinking about power in sovereign terms,
calling for a ‘reconstruction’ of Leviathan.19 Far from acknowledging the limits to
sovereign power, this argument draws upon Gilles Deleuze’s concept of ‘control
societies’,20 noting the increased efficiency and economy of state and corporate power
in the mundane regulation of civil society, a situation they provocatively characterise as
‘soft fascism’ and the ‘micro-fascism of everyday life’:
The welfare state relied on and produced patrician experts who took a benign view of the
troubled delinquents they were expected to rehabilitate . . . We are now witnessing the arrival
of new – often deskilled – cadres of security experts. These no longer see, and are no longer
expected to see, the individual as a composite being whose biography they need to under-
stand but rather as individuals reduced to clusters of denaturalized risks each of which
requires coercive management.21
In support of this proposition, which they regard as exemplifying the current re-articula-
tion of security in liberal welfare state formations, Hallsworth and Lea cite the redefinition
of the poor as ‘at risk’ groups to be coercively controlled rather than vulnerable groups to
whom entitlements need to be better extended.22 In many respects, the acid test of this
shift is the treatment of young people, particularly those from disadvantaged family
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backgrounds, as risks with ‘anti-social’ proclivities requiring increasingly forensic sur-
veillance and regulation (behaviour orders, curfews, electronic tagging, incapacitative
custody etc.) rather than as citizens with rights whose delinquency is as much a collective
failure of state power to adequately extend their entitlements to social inclusion as it is of
individual pathologies in need of correction.23
If penal welfarism has been displaced by risk management, then the security state
formation is also characterised by Hallsworth and Lea in terms of its preoccupation with
more ‘powerful offenders,’ in particular those associated with alleged ‘transnational
organised crime’ and inter-continental terrorism. The recourse to pre-emptive interven-
tions (in extremis, those of ‘rendition’), the abrogation of due process in criminal justice
(including intrusive, mass surveillance of digital communications) and reversals in the
burden of criminal proof (as in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, requiring suspects in
England and Wales to demonstrate their assets were not gained through criminal enter-
prise) have all been legitimated in relation to the alleged exceptionality of the threats
posed by these new kinds of powerful offender.24
‘Securitization’,25 in which the suspension of due process and normal democratic
oversight of security strategies is justified on the grounds of the exceptional character of
powerful offending and consequently the existential threat it poses to licit political
economies, has also been justified in terms of the functional over-spill of globalization
and other exercises in ‘de-bordering’ controls on the free movement of people, goods,
services and capital (as in the European Union’s Single Market). Powerful offending and
existential threat are constructed in official narratives as a consequence of this freedom of
movement, which in turn requires more exceptional executive powers of surveillance and
regulation.26 Finally, it is argued the security state, although more typical of the British
context than other European contexts, especially those in the remnants of Scandinavian
social democracies, is further consolidated by the global import/export trade in security
policies. Such policy transfer, augmented by the proliferation of transnational statutory
and commercial networks, privileges tendencies toward the isomorphic reproduction of
the security state rather than tendencies toward its resistance and consequent
variegation.27
For all the rich conceptual insight of arguments over the decentralisation or re-
centralisation of nation-state power, it can be argued that framing security in terms of
the limits to, or conversely the efficacy of, sovereign power misdiagnoses the real powers
and liabilities of security, particularly those that inhere in the relations of power-depen-
dence. To this end, and against the Hobbesian construction of political power, there are
important analytical lessons to be drawn from that strategic concept of power which has
been traced back to the first empirical student of political authority ‘in action’, in the
Florentine Court of the Medici, Niccolo Machiavelli, and in the thought of those working
in the subsequent Machiavellian framework of power: Gramsci, Foucault, Callon and
Latour.28
2.2. Strategic power and security: putting Leviathan in its place
In The Prince Machiavelli offers a rich descriptive ethnography of power conceived in terms
of its strategies. Towards these strategies he takes no moral stance: they are neither good nor
bad, their only purpose is their effectiveness. They flow from no principle of sovereignty;
they serve no principle of sovereignty; they reproduce no principle of sovereignty. . .. Power
does not belong to anyone nor to any place; it is not something that princes necessarily have;
it is no Leviathan. Power is simply the effectiveness of strategies for achieving for oneself a
greater scope for action than for others implicated by one’s strategies. Power is not any thing
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nor is it necessarily inherent in any one; it is a tenuously produced and reproduced effect
which is contingent upon the strategic competencies and skills of actors who would be
powerful.29
The central paradox of power: the power of an agency is increased in principle by that agency
delegating authority; the delegation of authority can only proceed by rules; rules necessarily
entail discretion and discretion potentially empowers delegates. From this arises the tacit and
taken-for-granted basis of organizationally negotiated order, and on occasion, its fragility and
instability.30
In his own reflection on Machiavelli’s conceptual framework, Latour states the paradox of
power more succinctly: the difference between the potential to exercise power and the
actual exercise of power is always the actions of others.31 Power inheres not in actors but
in their social relations. The value of Clegg’s further reworking of this strategic-relational
concept of power is in its focus on distinctive circuits that fix and re-fix the rules of
membership and meaning that constitute powers of association in these networks and on
innovations in the techniques of discipline and production that facilitate the disruption,
destabilisation and reformulation of these rules. Before applying concepts from this
‘circuits of power’ framework to the paradoxes and consequent multi-centred governance
of security, it is worth recalling why those working with a strategic concept of power were
so concerned to ‘unscrew the great Leviathan’32 or as Foucault vividly remarked, why it
remains important for political theory to ‘cut off the kings head’.33 As it will be further
elaborated below, if this injunction was important for histories of the present in the 1970s
it is even more the case in the emerging contours of digital society with its proliferating
technologies of disruption, insecurity and risk.34
If it is accepted that power is relational not proprietorial, then it is possible to
acknowledge the role of state actors in associations of membership and meaning without
necessarily granting them a privileged position within these associations. Even if it is
acknowledged, apropos Michael Mann, that there are asymmetrical relations between state
actors (with certain ideological, economic, political and military resources) and other
commercial and civic actors, then state agencies are still not independent of these other
actors for the accomplishment of their governing strategies. If, as Mann argues, the
‘leading edge’ of social power in the early 21st century is the United States,35 its struggle
to project its own national security interests in the Middle Eastern conflicts of the past
decade is a salutary reminder of the limits to sovereign projects. Within the metropolitan
life of the US itself, urban political analysis has also emphasised the interdependence of
state and corporate actors in the ‘power to’ fix and re-fix regimes of governance as the
constitutional-legal powers and electoral mandates of state actors are necessarily traded
with corporate actors for the financial, organisational and informational resources that are
needed to actually deliver on these mandates.36
This takes us some distance from the accomplishment of ‘fascistic’ rule, even of the
‘soft’, mundane, variety in liberal modes of security. Relations of power-dependence
suggest that authoritarian state projects, premised on sovereign command and control,
are destined37 to be organisationally out-flanked by competing centres of power that
recognise the need to translate their potential to govern into actually existing strategies
of governance. In this sense, the imperative of acting through others is a necessary
‘standing condition’ of governance. How this standing condition is acknowledged, inter-
preted and manipulated for strategic advantage by competing security actors is, however, a
contingent relationship whose negotiation and practical accomplishment will be context-
specific. Effective translations are those that can better fix/re-fix the interests of others in
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their problems, enrolling and mobilising these interests into stable governing coalitions
through mutually beneficial exchange relationships.38 This point has been grasped in the
policy networks literature39 and through reference to the ‘exogenous’ shocks to governing
coalitions that can be generated by innovations or crises of production and discipline in
the interrelationship between state and corporate actors.40
However, the more pressing analytical challenge, certainly for understanding the
strategic powers of association in problems of security, is to recognise the contribution
of actors in civil society to the constitution of circuits of power and resistance.
Criminological work has begun to address this through reference to strategies for ‘govern-
ing from below’ adopted by, for example, paramilitaries, serious crime networks and
vigilantes.41 Another frontier is the consideration of ‘power and resistance 2.0ʹ or the
disruptive implications for security strategies of digital technologies, deployed through the
‘interactive’ second generation of the World Wide Web. To this end, there is a need for a
framework for understanding relations of power and resistance amongst multiple centres
of security.
2.3. Multi-centred governance: distinguishing centres, networks and circuits of power
The provenance and contribution of the proposed theory of multi-centred governance to
arguments about liberal modes of security can be clarified further through reference to
recent developments in the ongoing dispute between state-centred and network-distributed
concepts of political power. This dispute can be understood in terms of ‘second order’
theories of power and ‘third order’ reflections on the methodological assumptions under-
pinning these theories and how the interaction of second and third order accounts re-
constitute governable problems of security in particular ways.42
At the core of second order disputes about security is a binary argument over
whether political power has a (singular) centre, as in the imagery of the Leviathan, or
whether it ought to be understood as a social force lacking any centre at all.43 The
contention here is that this binary argument generates a false dilemma for social
science. Privileging a particular centre of power, such as the nation state, obscures
the grounds for resistance to, and thus variegation in, the exercise of this power within
and across, as well as between nation states, as recognised in work on trans-national,
sub-national and supra-national ‘fields of security’.44 Conversely, the preoccupation
with the dissipation of political power into a plethora of networks constituted by
‘nodes’ or ‘bubbles’ of governance, as in the conduct of children by parents in
families, of tourists by commercial security on-board aircraft, or of ‘denizens’ by
informal conflict resolution committees in townships,45 obscures important asymme-
tries in the capacity of different kinds of governor to project their strategic power. To
take the example of the family as an instance of nodal governance, a parent may have
certain, more immediate, capacities to conduct the conduct of children in their family
but these capacities are shaped, in turn, by the standing conditions of family life as set
by state and corporate powers, such as access to accommodation, income support,
additional childcare, education and employment opportunities and so forth.46 In this
instance, family nodes are located within a broader assemblage of power relations
which set the strategic context for parents’ capacity to govern their own children. In
turn, however, those state powers interested, in Michael Mann’s terms, in increasingly
‘interfering’ in family life cannot do so forensically and ubiquitously for all families
and are therefore dependent on the discretion parents have to immediately conduct the
conduct of their children in accordance with state social policy objectives.
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As such, the multi-centred theory of governance (MCG) transcends the binary argu-
ment over whether political power is either state-centred or lacks any centre at all by
focussing on the asymmetrical relations of power-dependence amongst the range of actors
that compete to establish themselves as obligatory passage points for constituting and
acting upon particular governable problems. These relations can only exist because there
are rival centres of power and resistance which aspirant governors, such as parents,
teachers, municipal authorities, police forces and core executives are obliged to negotiate.
In turn this provokes the question of whether and, if so, why certain centres of power
prevail over others in particular places, for particular periods in relation to specific
problems. In answer to this, the multi-centred theory of governance conceptualises
power as necessarily related to resistance, as producing resistance, and therefore as an
ongoing struggle rather than an accomplished state formation.
At this point it might be objected that the MCG simply reiterates the decentred
concept of power found in other network-distributed theories of governance, particularly
those inspired by Foucault’s study of governmentality47 and Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept of ‘assemblage’.48 There is certainly an affinity with these theories and a shared
intellectual provenance in the Machiavellian framework of strategic power but the MCG
is distinguished from these theories of governance by the analytical priority it accords to
the circuits of power and resistance that produce and disrupt the rival centres or obligatory
passage points of power. Rather than abstracting particular ‘nodes’ or ‘bubbles’ of
governance from the network of asymmetrical relations of power-dependence in which
they are entangled, the MCG is concerned with the interrelationship between rival centres
of power, the dispositions that integrate actors in these centres, however temporarily, the
standing conditions which privilege certain centres of power over others and the technol-
ogies of production and discipline that can alter these conditions and promote particular
governing dispositions whilst destabilising others. In this way, the focus upon circuits of
power informs causal explanations, not just descriptions, of governing assemblages, how
they are formed and why they are reproduced, challenged and replaced.
This latter point is especially important for justifying the comparative methodological
aim of the MCG which addresses the recent interest in explaining the success and failure
of rival governing projects pursued within the same nation state contexts.49 A corollary of
this aim is that governance needs to be understood in ‘global perspective’ for both societal
and social scientific reasons. It is argued that real-world conditions of the increased
transnational mobility of illicit, as well as licit, capital, labour, goods and services
emphasise localities, particularly powerful city-regions, rather than nations as the primary
focus of social and political change.50 Knowledge about, and opportunities for emulating,
governing arrangements beyond the nation state have also been driven by the revolution
in digital communications technologies, particularly the internet, equipping both social
actors and social scientists with instantaneous access to a greater volume and variety of
comparative data. In this context the capacity for transnational policy transfer, emulation,
plagiarism and adaptation is intensified, further undermining the idea that local practices
of governing can be understood as autonomous, abstracted from the global-local relations
in which they are enmeshed.
In these terms the methodology underpinning the MCG can be distinguished from
rival ‘third order’ accounts of researching governance and security, in particular the binary
opposition of ‘formal’ and ‘historicist’ methodologies. The inclination behind the formal
approach is to generalise about processes of governance, by seeking uniform qualities and
substantiating universally applicable explanations, as in the examples of ‘securitization’
and ‘the security state’.51 By contrast, advocates of historicism argue that to adequately
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understand and explain processes of governing, it is necessary to see them as meaningful
activities dependent on particular social and historical contexts:
To discuss and explain this meaningful activity is to ascribe desires and beliefs to the relevant
actors . . . Social scientists have to do the empirical work of finding out what beliefs and
desires people actually hold in any given case. They have to rely less on formal models than
on contextual and historical explanations . . . Social scientists should adopt a noticeably more
interpretive approach in which practices appear as patterns of contingent activity explained by
reference to the meanings within them and the historical contexts of these meanings. 52
The distinctiveness of the methodology underpinning the MCG is in its treatment of the
context-dependency of security problems. If formal approaches under-contextualise
accounts of security, precluding the opportunity to question variegation within the same
context, then some historicist approaches provide over-contextualised accounts, inhibiting
an understanding of whether there are processes of governing that can be transferred
across contexts because they are context-independent.53 Instances of ‘strong’ historicism
can be found in studies of governmentality and ‘histories of the present’ that prefer thick
description or ‘diagnoses’ of specific governing arrangements to attempts to causally
explain them through comparative analyses of different contexts of governing.54 This
strong historicism argues that the very use of abstract concepts, like ‘securitization’,
produces misrepresentations of the contexts in question because they superimpose the
categories and concepts of theorists onto those of their research subjects in ways that
mistranslate and misrecognise the meanings which these subjects attribute to their own
activities. It is argued that causal explanations developed in a particular historical moment
cannot keep pace with processes of political change, they are highly perishable and cannot
but mistranslate problems of security in other moments. Hence the fundamental criticism
that formal models in social science fail to recognise their own historicity.55 For these
reasons the goals of critical social science, to arbitrate between rival truth-claims and
provide a more emancipatory understanding of the problems and governing arrangements
in question, must be rejected in favour of diagnostic descriptions of government. In
response, critics of this strong historicism argue it prevents commentators from posing
questions about why governing programmes prevail or fail,56 how they can be reformed
and what lessons can be drawn about this from comparative analysis.57 Advocates argue
the rejection of critique and explanation, ‘the burdens of sociological realism’,58 liberates
historicist accounts to be forward-looking in inventing alternative governing arrangements
and thinking, ‘how not to be governed thus’.59
As a consequence of these methodological orientations, and despite their profound
differences, both formal and historicist approaches inhibit explanations of the context-
dependency of governing arrangements. Historicist accounts assert the context-depen-
dency and patterns of contingent activity in governing arrangements rather than establish-
ing these through comparisons of what, if any, arrangements transfer across contexts. This
is particularly problematic given the plausible argument that processes of globalisation are
likely to intensify policy transfer across different governing contexts, as political actors
emulate established ‘best practice’ a process referred to as ‘mimetic institutional
isomorphism’.60 Whether governing arrangements for security are becoming more iso-
morphic is a moot question for empirical investigation but methodologically this implies
the definition of a comparative framework using common concepts to differentiate
processes of convergence and divergence.61 Formal approaches may distinguish between,
for example, ‘securitization’ in general and particular instances of securitization62 but
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even so, this formal theory draws attention away from any other governing arrangements
for security that may be discovered through context-sensitive research, such as multiple
case studies that contrast rival theories.63
By contrast, the methodology underpinning the multi-centred theory of governance
problematizes the context-dependence of governing arrangements by distinguishing
necessary relations of governing, which by definitional fiat will be found across different
contexts and which frame comparative analyses, from contingent relations that are con-
text-specific. This, it will be argued in the third section of this article, is especially
important for understanding the interplay of global – local relations and how these
complicate the isolation of national or local contexts of security. As such, context is
understood as a relational concept whose meaning can only be grasped in relation to that
which is context-independent.
In turn, this requires a method of articulation that is distinct from both the formal
modelling of governing arrangements and the historicist description of particular govern-
ing arrangements. This method can be found in the epistemology of critical realism which
conceptualises any social problem as being ‘concrete’, a ‘unity of diverse aspects’, which
can only be understood through a process of abstraction, isolating in-thought what these
diverse aspects might be, as a precursor to investigating how these aspects come together
in particular, ‘real-concrete’, instances.64 The multi-centred theory of governance uses this
epistemology to isolate, in thought, the necessary relations of governing security, without
which arrangements for governing security could not exist, as a precursor to concrete
studies of how these necessary relations occur within and are shaped by contingently-
related conditions. In these terms the context-dependency of governing security can be
grasped through an understanding of how necessary and contingent relations are config-
ured in particular places and moments.
Reasserting causal explanation in this way also enables the normative aspects of
critical social science to be addressed. In contrast to the ‘non-committed analytic’ of
detailed configurations of rule found in historicist approaches,65 this methodology reas-
serts the objectives of explaining the causes, reproduction and failure of governing
arrangements as a premise for reflecting not just on ‘how not to be governed thus’ but
on ‘why we ought to be governed better’ and ‘how this could be so’.66
In the remainder of the article it is suggested, in keeping with a strategic concept of
power, that the circuits of power framework67 provides a useful source of abstractions
about the multi-centred governance of security: the standing conditions and dispositions
of governing arrangements for security and the technologies that can reproduce or disrupt
these arrangements. The implications of this approach for studies of security are illustrated
through reference to ‘urban security’ and transnational organised crime. These problems
of security exemplify the public policy impulse to problematise security in ways that
constitute the powers and responsibilities of sovereign authorities, particularly nation
states and regional ‘city-states’.68 Once they are rearticulated in the terms of circuits of
causal, dispositional and facilitative power, however, it becomes possible to challenge the
assumptions behind this policy discourse and recognise the integral relationships amongst
multiple centres for governing security. In this way, the multi-centred theory reconstitutes
the problems of governing security as problems of circuits of power rather than accom-
plished state formations or context-specific networks.
In constitutional-legal terms it is understandable that problems are articulated in the
terms of the sovereign centres constituted in law as responsible nation states or local
governments. This should not be confused, however, with the sociological experience of
these problems in civil society and their accomplishment through the interplay of global
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and local relations captured in the, admittedly inelegant, concept of ‘glocalisation’.69 As
will be illustrated further below, an uncritical adoption of the public policy discourse on
‘urban security’ leads to a concern with the experience of cities and urban populations as
if they were abstracted from the circuits of inter-city relations produced through the
greater movement of capital, labour, goods and services across national borders.
Conversely, viewing urban security as an emergent product of circuits of causal,
dispositional and facilitative power clarifies the integral relationship between cities and
an emergent ‘world urban system’ of inter-city relations.70 In these terms, the inter-
dependence of ‘transnational organised crime’ and ‘urban security’ makes sense when
the analytical focus is shifted from discrete governable places to governable circuits.
For example, the trafficking of heroin from the Middle East, via the Balkans into
Amsterdam, as the principal wholesale drugs market destination in Europe, and back
out to London but then onto the principal provincial wholesale centres for narcotics in
Britain: the West Midlands, Greater Manchester and Merseyside.71 As such, the threat
posed by heroin markets to security within large British cities cannot be understood
once divorced from the chain of trafficking networks that facilitate the movement of
this product from its origins in the Middle East. Following the illicit product and the
‘crime script’72 through which it is produced, distributed and consumed soon leads to
the collapse of neat distinctions between the domestic, transnational and international
places of security.73
3. Circuits of power: causal, dispositional and facilitative security
Clegg draws upon the sociology of organisations to argue that ‘agency’ is not reducible to
individual actors but can also refer to organisations which are, in turn, the emergent
product of social relations. From this axiom, he dismantles possessive individualistic
theories of power, from the Leviathan through to concepts of power in terms of the
decisions or non-decisions taken in legislative arenas74 and to contemporary theories of
rational choice. The focus on sovereignty is displaced by a concern with the social
relations of translation that can constitute governing strategies. Shifting the analytical
focus from properties to relations implies an allied movement away from architectural
concepts of the ‘levels’, ‘tiers’ and ‘spheres’ at which governance is organised to a
concern with the circuits through which any governing project must flow if it is to be
reproduced and sustained. In this regard the nation-state or the urban regime matter not
because they are discrete tiers of governance but because they signify certain standing
conditions for the actual exercise of power. Understanding these social relations and their
reproduced or disrupted conditions of existence requires the disambiguation of three
analytically distinct but practically interrelated circuits of power: the causal, dispositional
and facilitative.
3.1. Causal powers: the standing conditions of security
Episodic instances of the power of (individual or organisational) agents are the most
apparent circuit of power and resistance, epitomised in formulations of ‘A’ getting ‘B’ to
do something ‘B’ resists doing. Even here, however, such causal power is generated by
various ‘standing conditions’ in the relationship between ‘A’ and ‘B’ which are less
obvious. They can include the constitutional-legal powers an actor may possess, and
their access to unequally distributed financial, organisational, informational and political
resources which can be used to leverage and negotiate favourable outcomes.
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To revisit imagery of the ‘security state’ formation in Britain, instances of such causal
power include the proliferation of legislative action on volume crime and ‘anti-social
behaviour’, the organisation of serious crimes and terrorism. However, what is of interest
in this circuit are the standing conditions which could, possibly, result in ‘A’ (e.g.
constabularies) getting ‘B’ (e.g. prolific and priority offenders) to desist, much less the
accomplishment of some soft fascistic regulation of everyday life. It is precisely because
the standing conditions of causal relations between crime and control are so disputed that
the plausibility of an accomplished security state is questionable. In Britain this causal
relationship has been rendered problematic during the era of upward trends in officially
registered and self-reported volume crimes (from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s) which
were in an inverse relationship to the increasing legislative powers, financial resources,
organisational capacities and informational resources provided to both public and com-
mercial policing.75 This causal relationship has become even more problematic to grasp
during the current era of an apparent ‘crime drop’, which has been registered in police
records and household victim surveys since the mid-1990s despite dramatic reductions in
expenditure on constabularies and other crime-relevant public authorities, particularly
local governments, since the advent of the Coalition Government’s (2010 – 2015)
‘austerity’ programme.76 In both of these eras the overriding standing condition of the
crime – control relationship appears to be one of disconnection.77
More nuanced interpretation and analysis of these national trends suggests they
mask the grossly unequal, ‘Lorenz curve’, distribution of victimisation for volume
personal and property crimes, in which the top decile of high crime neighbourhoods is
estimated to account for the overwhelming proportion of theft, burglary and violence
against the person, both publicly and in the home.78 Even so, this suggests that far
from ‘fixing’ a soft fascistic security state, the standing condition of volume crime and
control would appear to be one of the abandonment, rather than forensic regulation, of
those vulnerable populations amongst whom victimisation is being concentrated, parti-
cularly in high crime urban neighbourhoods.79 This is especially pertinent given the
greater policy and analytical interest in the variegated crime – control relationships that
are captured in concepts of ‘community safety’ or ‘urban security’ regimes. These
regimes coalesce around policy agendas advancing admixtures of criminal justice,
restorative justice, social justice and risk management.80 As noted above, however, a
strategic-relational concept of power shifts the analytical focus from governable places
to governable circuits through which transnational problems like the narcotics trade are
constituted and contested. In so doing, the multi-centred theory further elaborates the
standing conditions of crime – control relationships challenging the presupposition that
they can be sensibly understood within administrative categories of national or sub-
national state sovereignty.
A standing condition of disconnection between crime and control is also evident in
studies of controlling the ‘powerful offenders’ that Hallsworth and Lea identify as
evidence of an accomplished security state. Much of the empirical research on the
organisation of serious crime suggests control strategies premised on the surveillance,
prosecution or even ’disruption‘ of ’organised crime groups’ and their ‘core nominals’ are
routinely outflanked by more fluid criminal networks, such as ’slinger gangs’ brought
together for specific ‘project crimes’ by ’criminal contact brokers’ acting as illicit
recruitment consultants for particular jobs.81 A more convincing depiction of the standing
conditions for the organised crime – control relationship is therefore of an asymmetrical
relationship between state and commercial authorities and ‘protieform criminalities’.82
The latter have the resources and counter-surveillant intelligence to adapt new social
250 A. Edwards
technologies to organisationally outflank state security, especially given their transnational
and cross-jurisdictional mobility, the epitome of which being the failed ’war on drugs’.83
3.2. Dispositional powers: the rules of security practice
Apropos the strategic-relational concept of power, however, standing conditions only
confer the potential to exercise power, its actual exercise implies the actions of others
and, therefore, the disposition of these others to conform or resist. Dispositions can, in
turn, be understood in terms of the rules of practice which ‘fix’ or ‘re-fix’ the meaning
and membership of governing arrangements amongst a coalition of actors. Actors have
to ‘buy-in’ to the membership categorization devices (MCD’s)84 used to constitute or
‘problematise’ governance in ways that continue to interest, enrol and mobilise a
coalition whilst disinteresting actors in the causes of other coalitions: a strategic
relationship described by Callon as the ‘four moments of translation’.85 When fixed,
these rules of practice will oblige would-be governors to adhere to, or adapt, an
established problematisation or else to discredit and replace it but, in each case, to
necessarily engage with it as an ‘obligatory passage point’ in the actual exercise of
power.
Central to the standing conditions of disconnection between the causes of crime and
control is the disposition of many state actors, particularly those with a self-referential
interest in police and criminal justice solutions to social and economic problems.
Garland’s concept of ‘punitive display’86 goes someway to capturing this as does
Loader and Sparks’ more recent account of the ‘heated’ qualities of public criminology.87
This disposition fixes the meaning and membership of public debates about security to
understandable empathy with victims, particularly of egregious ‘signal’ crimes88 such as
terrorist incidents, the abuse of minors and of other vulnerable groups particularly the
elderly, and unmitigated castigation of ‘signal’ offenders, such as sex offenders, violent
young males especially from ethnic minorities and other ‘outsider’ groups. These rules of
practice foreground categorisation devices of enforcement, punishment, retribution and
warfare notwithstanding the cumulative evidence of their counterproductive, crimino-
genic, and even ‘deadly’, tendencies.89 An interesting development in the rules of practice
in Britain, however, is the administrative appeal to logical and ‘evidence-based’ policy-
making. Garland90 identifies this as an adaptive strategy that operates, sotto voce, behind
the punitive display of public criminology, accepting the normality of crime but identify-
ing pragmatic, situational, opportunities for its reduction.91 Eclipsed by these punitive-
populist and rational-bureaucratic dispositions are the discredited social democratic rules
of practice, the disposition that dare not speak its name: that social inequalities character-
ise much offending and victimisation implying a re-translation of criminal justice and risk
management strategies back into matters of social justice and allied social and economic
policy responses.
The dispositional power of criminal justice and risk management is further evidenced
by the eclipse of any social democratic translation of serious crime and terrorism,
particularly through the categorisation device of ‘transnational organised crime’. In this
security field, the externalising devices that categorise and often interrelate Jihadism,
drugs trafficking, people trafficking and illegal immigration continue to define national
and European-wide ‘threat assessments’.92 In categorising security threats as ‘external’
impositions on otherwise unproblematic political-economies, these assessments obviate
any responsibility that western political authorities and populations have for exporting
security problems that come back to haunt them, whether as a consequence of foreign
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policy decisions or the demand-side stimulus to markets in drugs and vice from con-
sumers of illicit goods and services.93
Counterpoised to Garland’s historiography of contemporary crime control strategies,
however, are studies of the use of the categorisation device, ‘urban security’ and its
Anglophile equivalent, ‘community safety’, to re-fix the meaning and membership of
governable practices around the crime – control relationship.94 The European Forum for
Urban Security is a transnational policy network of over 400 municipal authorities
committed to the Aubervilliers and Saint Denis Manifesto on, Security, Democracy and
Cities, which explicitly states its social democratic disposition, arguing that, ‘Europe is
experiencing imbalances and disparities, in particular an outburst of unemployment,
which has plunged European citizens into a state of anxiety, weakening the social fabric
and trust in the future . . . In each of its localities, the crisis threatens social cohesion and
solidarity, making selfishness and individualism emerge’.95 It is also clear from research
into the meaning in-use of this categorisation device that ‘urban security’ is being used to
re-fix the crime – control relationship around more anticipatory practices of governance
including the adoption of digital technologies in efforts to predict and pre-empt security
threats as well as to broaden the governmental concern beyond crime to a wider repertoire
of harms.96 In Lucia Zedner’s memorable phrase, security is used to forge a governmen-
tality that is ‘pre-crime and post-criminology’.97
3.3. Facilitative powers: transforming security practices
It is acknowledged that, by definitional fiat, ‘rules of practice’ generate an inherent
conservatism in the continuity of governing problems and arrangements. This is com-
pounded by the risk-aversion to gambling on radical changes, the outcomes of which are
uncertain and potentially damaging to proponents. By contrast, it is less of a gamble to
copy successful actors and so ‘institutional isomorphism’ is a predominant governmental
disposition as is the fear of being discredited for revising one’s commitments or, in the
argot of contemporary British politics, ‘U-turning’. Yet, however rare, major policy
change does occur. Understanding how rules of practice can be reproduced, disrupted
or transformed by innovations in technologies of production and discipline is the purpose
of Clegg’s third ‘facilitative’ circuit of power. Herein, innovation can be characterised as
an incremental consequence of fixed rules of practice or as an adaptation to ‘exogenous
environmental contingencies’, such as technological breakthroughs, political and eco-
nomic crises, military conflagrations, unplanned mass migration and the related exhaus-
tion of political-economic models. Exogenous shocks can facilitate disruption in rules of
practice by disempowering and discrediting dominant dispositions and they may facilitate
the transformation of these rules by empowering extant but marginalised dispositions or
the innovation of new dispositions.98 Another scenario is that external shocks disempower
all extant dispositions without generating any new rules of practice resulting in extended
periods of governance failure and drift.
In this regard the two most obvious exogenous environmental contingencies fuelling
the import and export of insecurity in Europe are the ailing war on terror in the Middle
East and the pursuit of austere public expenditure rounds degrading governing capacity at
home and amongst fellow member states of the European Union.99 These, however,
foreground state actors as facilitators of major changes to the rules of practice and their
dispositional powers and liabilities whereas a consequence of the very degradation of
governing capacity that has accompanied ‘austerity’ programmes in European countries is
the increasing significance of civil society as a focus of governance and security.
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Admittedly, state and civil society are always in an integral relationship,100 one cannot
understand developments in one field without a grasp of developments in the other, but
the shifting and asymmetrical qualities of this relationship need to be grasped to appreci-
ate innovations in, and the consequences of, technologies of discipline and production. In
a context in which major state agencies in Britain, including constabularies and municipal
authorities, have had their budgets reduced by over a third and, in some service areas, by
over two thirds, it seems perverse to privilege a statist research programme on security
over one prioritising security within civil societies characterised increasingly by the
withdrawal of state intervention. How might this withdrawal disrupt and transform
relations of discipline and production within civil society? Might it provoke the kind of
self-governing order envisaged by advocates of the ‘big society’, one of a spontaneous
proliferation of supportive, voluntary, associations? What might be the criminogenic
consequences of such private government? To paraphrase a key concept from
Poulantzas, is the ‘authoritarian state formation’ liable to be superseded by variants of
‘authoritarian gangsterism’ in conditions of weak or negligible state intervention?
The facilitative power arising out of technologies of discipline and production in
austere conditions of governance is exemplified by the breakthroughs associated with
‘disruptive digital technologies’ (DDTs).101 These have the potential to further empower
or disempower dominant dispositions including the resurgence of non-governmental
actors in civil society relative to state and corporate actors. It is in this latter sense that
DDTs are of particular interest to arguments over the re-centring, decentring or circuitous
qualities of security, for they may consolidate or disempower predominant criminal justice
and risk management dispositions, they may facilitate a resurgent social justice, they may
facilitate a new disposition, akin to the revanchist populism of various nationalist move-
ments in Western Europe, and so forth.102
Hitherto much of the debate around DDTs has been couched in terms of their
consequences for commerce:
The parade of new technologies and scientific breakthroughs is relentless and is unfolding on
many fronts. Almost any advance is billed as a breakthrough, and the list of ‘next big things’
grows ever longer. Yet some technologies do in fact have the potential to disrupt the status
quo, alter the way people live and work, rearrange value pools, and lead to entirely new
products and services. Business leaders can’t wait until evolving technologies are having
these effects to determine which developments are truly big things. They need to understand
how the competitive advantages on which they have based strategy might erode or be
enhanced a decade from now by emerging technologies – how technologies might bring
them new customers or force them to defend their existing bases or inspire them to invent
new strategies.103
To further specify the identification of disruptive technologies, the McKinsey Global
Institute (MGI) defines four criteria:
● The technology is rapidly advancing or experiencing breakthroughs
● The potential scope of impact is broad
● Significant economic value could be affected
● Economic impact is potentially disruptive104
As a consequence, 12 disruptive technologies are identified including the mobile internet,
the automation of knowledge work, 3-D printing through processes of additive manufac-
ture and the development of unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs), such as drones.105
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With some reworking of the MGI criteria, it is possible to think about the disruptive
consequences of these social technologies for security. As indicated in Table 1, DDTs are
of interest to debates over multi-centred security because they may enhance the panoptic
surveillant powers of state and corporate actors,106 but they also facilitate the synoptic
power of the many to monitor and challenge the few and, in some instances, with
potentially lethal effects, as in the networked distributed manufacture of firearms and
ammunition.107 Of further interest is the capacity of DDTs to facilitate a form of ‘poly-
optic’ power in which the many watch the many and in which many are empowered to
circumvent the obligatory passage points of pre-digital society, such as print and broadcast
news editors or licensed firearms suppliers.
To take but three DDTs, it is possible to use the automation of knowledge work, the
development of 3D printing and advances in autonomous vehicle technology to illustrate
how facilitative power can transform security practices. A particularly striking example of
this kind of power is the utilisation and subversion of automated knowledge work in
contemporary urban political protests such as the use of social media against President
Erdogan’s Islamist regime in the Gezi Park protests by the secular and feminist movement
in Turkey.108 Mindful of attempts by the Turkish intelligence and security services to
monitor and target activists in this movement through algorithms used to survey social
Table 1. Disruptive digital technologies and security.


































































































media communications about anti-Erdogan protests, participants ‘dodged’ this surveil-
lance through ‘sub-tweeting’ (in which surrogate terms are used to identify and criticise
Erdogan’s regime), ‘screen capture’ (in which it is the photograph of the social media
communication that is broadcast rather than the actual words, again escaping detection by
an algorithm that would simply sense the presence of a photographic image) and ‘hate-
linking’ (in which social media users simply provide a link to other critical communica-
tions without explicitly expressing a particular opinion themselves).109
A more lethal or more emancipatory facilitative power, depending on one’s stance on
gun control, is the 3D printing of firearms and ammunition. Libertarians, such as the
American firm ‘Defense Distributed’ promote their printable plastic gun, ‘The Liberator’,
as a means of individual emancipation from overweening state power. Its critics note its
lethal potential for individual users, given major problems of quality assurance and the
instability of the product itself.110 The broader significance and prospective development
of such technology, however, is its potential to further weaponise civil society and
circumvent the kind of stricter gun control laws in jurisdictions which, some argue, are
responsible for dramatic variations in the pattern of lethal firearms-related violence within
and across nation states.111
A further illustration of the facilitative powers and liabilities of DDTs is provided by
Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs) more colloquially known as ‘drones’. Whilst
principally renowned for their military applications, as in the surveillance and bombing
missions undertaken by Western powers in Afghanistan, drones are becoming an increas-
ingly prominent technology for urban security as in the Dutch Hague Security Delta
(HSD) consortium’s promotion of UAVs for surveillance and crime prevention.112 This
consortium of ‘businesses, governments and knowledge institutions’ also undertakes
research and development into policing the use of drone technology by criminal enter-
prises and other non-state actors. One of its Small Business Innovation Research projects,
‘Innovative Security Solutions Against Drones’ has the aim of:
finding ways to take over control, intercept or redirect, and detect the location of the person in
control of such systems. Drones can for example be used to disrupt the public order and to
smuggle forbidden goods. Any approaches that could lead to detection, identification, and the
controlled removal of unmanned systems [are] of interest as well.113
In this regard drones exemplify the ‘arms race’ between perpetrators and preventers that
has long been recognised as a central dynamic in the organisation of serious crimes.114 In
this race, state and corporate technologies are appropriated by criminal enterprises and
other non-state organisations, including those employing political violence, in order to
anticipate and outflank state and corporate powers. In turn, this provokes further rounds of
innovation – appropriation – regulation as state and corporate powers produce technolo-
gical solutions to social problems of discipline whilst simultaneously attempting to
regulate the liabilities of these technologies for further undermining state and corporate
power.
4. Prospects for power and resistance in liberal modes of security
In terms of the circuits of power framework, the arms race provoked by the onset of
DDTs can be understood as facilitating a ‘risk management’ disposition which re-
fixes the meaning of urban security as a problem of pragmatic technological ‘solu-
tions’ rather than as a problem of social justice.115 Through this disposition, an
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attempt is made to restrict the standing conditions of the governance of security to the
pragmatic agenda of ’securocrats’, or consortia of state, commercial and knowledge
institutions (i.e. universities, consultants and think tanks) interested in technological
solutions. This agenda mobilises constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, infor-
mational and political resources for interventions that explicitly bracket-off and
discredit social and economic policy in order to privilege situational, pragmatic,
security agendas. 116
As noted, however, the risk management disposition can also be subverted by its own
technologies of production and discipline, once they are appropriated by other actors in
civil society, as in the synoptic powers of social media communication, the weaponisation
of civil society through printable firearms and the counter-surveillant use of drones. In
turn, DDTs can also be used to re-fix the meaning and membership of security around the
social justice agenda of policy networks such as the European Forum for Urban Security
and of social movements capable of using this technology to challenge ‘securocratic’
constructions of social problems.
In these terms the multi-centred theory provokes the study of strategic and relational
rather than sovereign and proprietorial powers and liabilities. The inter-dependence of
power and resistance within these relations implies a focus on contestation both of the
meaning and membership of security strategies, although in periods of stability the rules
of this contestation get fixed on dispositions that are highly resistant to change. Accounts
of public criminology have noted the resilience of criminal justice agendas which, despite
critical appeals to ‘evidence-based’ policy change and learning, remain central to the
policing of communities at home and abroad, albeit augmented by developments in risk
management. There are, however, reasons to suspect this disposition is being significantly
disrupted in the current era of exogenous shocks to security networks occasioned by
austere limitations to the investment in enforcement and the enhanced capacity of illicit
actor networks to outflank the panoptic powers of state surveillance.
The proposition is that the standing conditions for governing security, along with the
rules of practice for security, are being destabilised by the facilitative powers of DDTs.
Whether criminal justice and risk management dispositions are able to fix security
agendas in the context of a more intensive technological arms race, whether these agendas
get re-fixed around restorative and/or social justice agendas for security or whether the
prevailing circumstance is one of no predominant disposition in conditions of governance
failure and drift requires comparative research into the standing conditions for governing
security in different liberal democratic polities.
An empirical starting-point for this comparison is the claim that city-regions, rather
than nation states, are becoming the new obligatory passage points for fixing security
regimes in a ‘world urban system’ in which the porous borders of nation states enable
some regional, if not ‘global’, cities to project their political, economic and cultural power
at the cost of localities rendered increasingly peripheral by this system.117 The challenge
of maintaining a politics of solidarity and redistribution encountered by national social
democracies, let alone city-regions, enmeshed in these global relations would suggest the
rules of security practice in liberal polities are likely to swing even further away from
social justice towards risk management in an era of transnational, inter-city, competition.
However, research into the relatively successful adaptations of the Nordic model in
balancing market openness with social inclusion118 identifies an important variegation
in the response of liberal democratic polities to the standing conditions of global political-
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